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FISCHEL, WILLIAM A. Regulatory Tak-
ings: Law, Economics, and Politics. 
Pp. xi, 415. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995. $45.00. 
William Fischel's Regulatory Takings 
confronts one of the most difficult and 
significant questions in constitutional 
law: how should courts determine which 
government regulations run afoul of the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which requires the government to pro-
vide compensation when it takes private 
property? Broadly read, the clause would 
bar government regulations with redis-
tributive consequences, thus rendering 
the modern regulatory state unconstitu-
tional. This reading, championed by Pro-
fessor Richard Epstein, has achieved 
great prominence in academic and politi-
cal debates, but the vast preponderance 
of judges and academic commentators 
finds such a result both unattractive and 
unsound in terms of constitutional struc-
ture. None of the numerous alternative 
substantive readings of the clause that 
have been advanced, however, has won 
general acceptance (or anything close). 
Fischel seeks to shift the terms of what 
has become a stalemated debate by ad-
vancing a political process theory ap-
proach to the clause. Stressing the need 
for judicial modesty in a system of demo-
cratic government and the limits of judi-
cial capacity (particularly with regard to 
the federal bench), he argues that courts 
should "largely avert their eyes from the 
regulatory excesses of Congress and, for 
the most part, of state legislatures." But 
close judicial scrutiny oflocal regulations 
is appropriate for several reasons: (1) local 
government decisions, in contrast to 
decisions at the state and national levels, 
are particularly likely to fall on unrep-
resented outsiders; (2) local politics are pe-
culiarly subject to process failure; 
and (3) courts alone can provide redress. 
Even so, the judicial role here is limited. 
Movable property does not need special 
judicial protection. Thus courts should 
focus their attention primarily on local 
regulatory unfairness that affects im-
movable property, the principal form of 
which is land. 
The strongest part of Fischel's argu-
ment is the central premise that courts 
should in general defer to the political 
process, except where process failure is 
most likely. Others have in recent years 
advanced process theories of the takings 
clause (including myself), and Fischel has 
advanced this thesis previously. But, as 
he develops his point here, he gives it 
great richness and power. Regulatory 
Takings is, very simply, a tour de force. 
BOOK DEPARTMENT 
Fischel masterfully draws on not only his 
native discipline of economics but also, 
among other things, legal history, politi-
cal theory, jurisprudence, relevant em-
pirical studies, the case law and 
intriguing background facts that he has 
uncovered about the leading cases, the 
enormous legal literature on takings, and 
his own experience on the Hanover, New 
Hampshire, Zoning Board. 
As Fischel elaborates on his position, 
however, his claims are less compelling. 
In particular, he does not adequately ex-
plain why political appeals to state legis-
latures or the state electorate to overturn 
local decisions or to impose compensation 
requirements on local governments do 
not provide adequate nonjudicial redress 
for process failure at the local level. Simi-
larly, in discussing actual takings cases, 
Fischel pronounces regulations unconsti-
tutional with a frequency that is inconsis-
tent with his broader claim that the 
judicial role should be limited. What this 
principally illustrates, however, is not 
analytic weakness but the intractability 
of the takings issue. As it probes that 
issue with sophistication and subtlety 
(and in a lucid style that is a pleasure to 
read), Regulatory Takings not only makes 
an important contribution to the litera-
ture on takings law and on land use; it 
makes a place for itself as a major work 
on the larger subject of property rights 
and the Constitution. 
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